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ABSTRACT 
 
Bond market capitalisation in Sub-Saharan Africa is low even compared with the other developing 
economies. This dissertation thus examines the drivers of the development of local currency bond 
markets in 15 Sub-Saharan African economies over the period from 2003 to 2013, with a focus on the 
significance of macroeconomic stability proxied by exchange rate volatility. The empirical analysis 
focuses on government bond capitalisation, while the corporate bond market analysis focuses on seven 
of these economies for the period of 2004 to 2015. Possible explanatory factors are identified from the 
literature which attributes the development of local currency bond markets in developing economies to 
macroeconomic and institutional factors.  
The results of a dynamic panel data model show that macroeconomic instability is significant and 
negatively associated with local currency bond market capitalisation. In contrast, capital account 
openness is found to expand the investor base, for the low to lower-middle income economies in 
particular, while monetary credibility is positive and significant for bond market development 
irrespective of the monetary policy framework. Thus, this research suggests that the optimal set of policy 
options for local currency bond market development should encompass exchange rate stabilisation, 
capital account liberalisation, and monetary credibility. 
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Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background of the study 
 
Since the 1990s, Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has been the world’s second fastest growing region, behind 
Asia (International Monetary Fund, 2016a). However, it remains the least developed across the globe, 
highlighting the need for continued development expenditure. Consequently, attracting infrastructure 
development is one of the key objectives across the subcontinent as demographic profiles shift, mainly 
as a result of rapid urbanisation, which in turn drives the need for the provision of power, water, transport 
and technology (PwC, 2014). 
Financial markets in SSA economies, most of which are categorised as low- and middle-income are still 
not well developed relative to the rest of the world (International Monetary Fund, 2016a). The level of 
financial intermediation in SSA remains low compared with that of other developing regions (Allen, 
Otchere and Senbet, 2011) and the region’s financial markets are dominated by the banking sector, the 
lending activities of which are geared mainly towards short- to medium-term loans (Mu, Phelps and 
Stotsky, 2013). This characteristic hinders the mobilisation of domestic capital for long-term financing, 
particularly for infrastructure projects. Consequently, SSA bond market capitalisation is below those of 
other developing regions, but its share of domestic debt is higher (Mu et al., 2013). Thus, access to 
funding is commonly highlighted as the leading challenge for large, complex infrastructure projects 
across SSA (PwC, 2014: 2).  
Ehlers (2014) stresses that most of the growth of infrastructure financing across the globe is carried by 
banks, which hold predominantly short-term liabilities and therefore cannot commit most of their assets 
to long-term lending due to the risk of liquidity mismatch. Additionally, higher capital requirements, as 
per Basel III regulations, are limiting bank funds available for long-term project finance. The situation 
requires SSA economies to develop sources of long-term funding to meet their developmental needs. In 
some SSA economies, government financing has been dominated by central bank issuance and external 
borrowing from multilateral and bilateral creditors, while the issuance of local currency bonds has been 
virtually non-existent1. 
Some countries, however, have been able to increase foreign participation in domestic bond markets 
and thus broaden the investor base2.  
                                                          
1 For example, in Swaziland, the central bank’s claims on the government surged by 363% in the 12 months to August 2016, 
while Malawi’s budget shortfall has been funded mainly by borrowing from the central bank, with the Reserve Bank of 
Malawi’s outstanding credit to the central government rising by 87% in the nine months to September 2016. 
2 For example, in South Africa, non-residents hold 35% of total bonds outstanding, 90% of which are denominated in the local 
currency (South African Reserve Bank, 2017). Non-resident investors’ holdings of local-currency government bonds in Zambia 
rose by an equivalent of 2.5% of GDP in 2017, raising foreign investor holdings of public commercial debt to over 60% (S&P 
Global Ratings, 2017: 6) 
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Demand for foreign currency bonds issued by Sub-Saharan sovereigns has been strong in recent years. 
Presbitero, Gura, Adedeji and Njie (2016) highlight that of the 15 low-income developing countries that 
have issued debut international sovereign bonds since 2015, 11 were in SSA. Ghana (September 2007), 
Zambia (September 2012), Rwanda (April 2013), Kenya (June 2014) and Ethiopia (December 2014) 
are among the SSA countries that have been able to float debut US dollar-denominated global bonds at 
favourable yields in recent years. Ghana was the first SSA sovereign after South Africa to float 
Eurobonds with a nominal value US$750 million, and then subsequently issued foreign currency debt 
in July 2013, September 2014, September 2016 and May 2018 totalling US$6,25 billion. All these bonds 
were on average three times oversubscribed, with the 2016 issue five times oversubscribed. Zambia also 
floated two more Eurobonds by the end of 2015, bringing the total value of its foreign currency bonds 
to US$3,0 billion. These developments reflected the strong appetite for frontier-market debt against the 
backdrop of low returns in developed financial markets. However, foreign currency borrowing exposes 
issuers to long-term currency fluctuations (Reserve Bank of Australia, 2003). 
The need to develop local currency markets for long-term debt is critical not only for infrastructure 
finance, but essentially for emerging market economies (EMEs) to avoid financing large budget deficits 
by central bank borrowing. Turner (2002) notes that bond markets facilitate the financing of budget 
deficits in a non-inflationary manner and they enhance the effectiveness of monetary policy. The 
objective for the development of bond markets is therefore not to replace bank finance, but to reinforce 
it (Mu et al., 2013).  
The motivation to develop capital markets for infrastructure financing is affirmed by the macroeconomic 
benefits of deep local currency long-term debt markets. Well-functioning local currency bond markets 
(LCBMs) and macroeconomic stability tend to be self-reinforcing, and thus significantly contribute to 
the reduction of risks associated with mismatches in currency, maturity and capital structure that can 
inhibit long-term capital formation (Miyajima, Mohanty and Chan, 2015). In addition, deeper local 
currency debt markets boost the ability of a country to withstand volatile capital flows, reduce the 
reliance on foreign borrowing and the risks associated with foreign currency fluctuations that create 
currency mismatches between domestic assets and foreign liabilities, facilitate the reduction of current 
account imbalances, mitigate the need to hold a high stock of foreign exchange reserves for 
precautionary purposes, and allow balance sheets to adjust more smoothly, thereby improving the 
capacity of macroeconomic policies to respond to shocks (International Monetary Fund, 2016b: 5). Deep 
LCBMs therefore help to mitigate the occurrence of the “original sin” (Eichengreen, Hausmann & 
Panizza, 2003), which describes the inability of a government to raise debt in its local currency as global 
financial flows are denominated in a few reserve currencies, and as a result accumulates large foreign-
currency liabilities. ’Original sin’ relates to both the difficulty in borrowing from foreign investors as 
well as issuing long-term debt instruments in the domestic market.  
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Given this backdrop, this research seeks to examine the significance of macroeconomic stability to the 
development of LCBMs in SSA. A stable macroeconomic policy framework is reflected primarily by 
steady output growth, low and stable inflation, low long-term interest rates, low fiscal deficits, and a 
low national debt burden relative to the size of the economy. Macroeconomic stability is influenced by 
the government through fiscal and monetary policies, and this is consistent with the trend of more stable 
macroeconomic environments in SSA over the past three decades, which Allen, Otchere & Senbet 
(2011:80) identified as the benefit of serious economic and financial reforms implemented since the 
1980s. International Monetary Fund (2016a) data indicates that the SSA inflation rate averaged 8.6% 
per annum over the 10-year period of 2006 to 2016 compared to 11.2% for the period of 1996 to 2006, 
and more than 30% in the 1980s. This improvement can be ascribed to the reforms adopted in the 1980s 
and 1990s, which comprised exchange rate liberalisation accompanied by structural reforms, lower 
fiscal deficits and limits on monetary expansions (Maehle, Teferra & Khachatryan, 2013). 
 
1.2 Statement of research problem 
The low level of financial development, particularly of LCBMs, inhibits the development of 
infrastructure, and thus economic development, as the subcontinent undergoes significant demographic 
shifts. PwC (2014) lists Ghana and Nigeria among the fastest urbanising countries across the globe, 
which highlights the need for these nations to raise large volumes of long-term infrastructure finance, 
an objective that is constrained by the limited size of long-term credit markets in these economies. 
SSA bond markets are small and illiquid, with primary markets for government bonds existing in some 
countries, but liquid secondary markets for bonds are virtually non-existent outside South Africa. LCBM 
capitalisation as a percentage of GDP in SSA is well below those of other developing regions such as 
Asia, Central Europe and most of Latin America (Christensen, 2004; Osano, 2011; Mu et al., 2013), 
which elevates the need to adopt policies that will contribute to the development of long-term debt 
markets (Allen et al., 2011).  
This study aims to apply econometric analysis to assess the association between macroeconomic 
stability and the demand for local currency bond markets in Sub-Saharan Africa over the period of 2003 
to 2015. 
 
Hence, the primary research question is as follows: 
Is macroeconomic stability as proxied by exchange rate volatility a significant factor for local currency 
bond market capitalisation in Sub-Saharan Africa?  
 
 4 
 
 
In addition, the following related sub-questions will also be assessed: 
• What is the linkage between capital account openness and macroeconomic stability in SSA 
economies? 
• To what extent does a possible association between monetary credibility and government bond 
market development in SSA differ between those that have adopted inflation targeting and those 
that have not? 
 
1.3 Statement of research objectives 
The research analyses the relationship between the stability of macroeconomic variables and the demand 
for local currency long-term debt. Allen et al. (2011) starts from the premise that macroeconomic 
stability is beneficial to the development of local currency financial markets. This study thus seeks to 
test this hypothesis, with a specific focus on the local currency bond market. The analysis further 
examines whether explicit inflation targeting policies contribute to local currency bond market 
capitalisation in SSA economies. 
To account for the presence of endogeneity among the independent variables, the study employs a GMM 
model. 
 
1.4 Justification for the study 
Research on the development of LCBMs in SSA is relatively limited. Most available studies of EME 
bond markets focus on Asian, Central European and Latin American economies. The unavailability of 
data has limited the scope of research on SSA bond markets, despite these having experienced 
encouraging growth in recent years (Thotho, 2014).  
This study will add to the body of research on SSA bond markets by encompassing the latest data on 
African central government debt compiled by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD, 2015) and corporate bond market data drawn from primary sources and 
Bloomberg. Adelegan and Radzewicz-Bak (2009), Mu et al. (2013), Berensmann, Dafe and Volz 
(2015), Essers, Blommestein, Cassimon, and Ibarlucea Flores (2016) and Dafe, Essers and Volz (2017) 
are the few comprehensive papers that are dedicated to the analysis of LCBMs in SSA. Mu et al. (2013) 
cover LCBMs in 36 economies over the period 1980 to 2010, but this period does not sufficiently 
incorporate the era of very low global interest rates and ample liquidity, which began in 2009 and has 
prompted the global investors’ search for yield. Additionally, while existing studies focus on the 
relationship between bond market development and institutional and macroeconomic factors, none of 
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the studies to date have analysed the contribution of explicit inflation targeting policies to LCBM 
capitalisation in SSA, hence this study fills the gap.   
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Chapter 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The volume of studies on the development of financial markets in both developed and developing 
economies is extensive, and, although the focus on SSA is increasing, the literature is scant relative to 
research on Asian and Latin American markets. Additionally, there is even less research on LCBMs in 
SSA, as most of the papers are devoted to the analysis of the expansion of banking and equity markets. 
The literature dedicated to emerging economies explores the determinants of the ability to borrow in 
international and domestic markets, in either foreign or domestic currency, with particular attention paid 
to the appropriate policy measures that foster local-currency borrowing capacity. Most existing research 
therefore addresses the basis of the inability of emerging markets to issue local-currency debt, the main 
theme of which is whether it is a consequence of exogenous factors (the effect of which cannot be 
ameliorated by macroeconomic and institutional policies), or evidence of policy shortcomings within 
these countries.  
The literature review is thus divided into four parts. In the first section, research on the concept of 
‘Original Sin’ and its determinants is reviewed. Secondly, studies that focus on a broader spectrum of 
the drivers of the aggregate financial sector and capital markets, with a particular focus on LCMBs in 
emerging economies, are reviewed. The third section focuses on papers that analyse LCMB 
development in SSA economies. The final section concludes the literature review. 
2.2 The concept of ‘Original Sin’ 
The long-standing characteristic of emerging markets relates to the inability to float domestic currency-
denominated international debt instruments, in addition to a considerable reliance on local currency-
denominated short-term domestic borrowing. The central hypothesis of ‘Original Sin’ associates the 
inherent macroeconomic volatility of small economies with the dominance of foreign currency-
denominated debt in their external obligations (Eichengreen and Hausmann, 1999). “Domestic Original 
Sin” denotes the inability to issue long-term debt instruments in the domestic market at fixed rates, while 
“international Original Sin” identifies the difficulty in raising domestic currency-denominated debt in 
global markets. 
Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) characterise ‘Original Sin’ as not being confined to emerging 
economies only but being broadly prevalent in developed economies, persistent over long periods of up 
to 150 years, accounted for by more than just bad policies and weak institutions, while it exacerbates 
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macroeconomic instability and limits policy flexibility. The study argues that ‘dollarisation’ – 
abandoning the domestic currency in favour of a reserve currency – does not offer redemption as it 
erodes a country’s ability to pursue other macroeconomic objectives. Developing domestic long-term 
credit markets is renounced on the basis that deep and liquid domestic financial markets take a long time 
to establish; hence countries would have to grapple with low growth and macroeconomic instability for 
long periods.  
Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza (2003a and 2003b) attribute the inability of some countries to issue 
international debt in their local currencies to the denomination of global financial flows in a few reserve 
currencies, the aftermath of which is the accumulation of large foreign-currency liabilities. Global bond 
issuance and bank debt are predominantly accounted for by a small number of currencies, primarily the 
G7 currencies and financial centre units such as the Australian dollar and the Swiss franc, due to the 
high transaction costs of holding multiple currencies. Residents of these countries issue 83% of 
international debt instruments, but their currencies account for more than 95% of global bond 
denomination, well above their global GDP shares. The difficulty of raising international debt 
denominated in local currency is, therefore, primarily a consequence of exogenous factors. ‘Original 
Sin’ is thus a “push” factor, the effect of which cannot be countered by policy measures in the small 
economies.  
Macroeconomic instability, reflected by high output variability and exchange rate volatility, as well as 
the volatility of capital flows and country credit ratings, is associated with the dominance of foreign-
currency debt (Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza, 2003a). Indebted economies that suffer from 
‘Original Sin’ are afflicted by currency mismatches and debt intolerance. The former reflects the 
dominance of foreign currency liabilities which propagate the balance-sheet effects of domestic 
exchange rate fluctuations, while the latter relates to the low capacity of EMEs to sustain high external 
debt stocks, expressed as the foreign debt-to-GDP ratio (Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza, 2003b). 
Hausmann and Panizza (2003) concede that there is no perfect measure of ‘Original Sin’ but extend the 
analysis to domestic debt issuance. The paper, based on 1998 annual data of 21 EMEs, regresses 
variables that encompass institutional factors, monetary policy credibility, fiscal solvency, the legal 
framework relating to contract enforcement, the de facto exchange rate regime, and political economy 
factors as well as international factors. Economic size, domestic credit extension and a composite of 
these variables are found to be the only significant determinants of the ability to issue domestic currency 
debt in international markets. The high prevalence of ‘Original Sin’ in small economies confirms the 
negative association between economic size and the ability to issue domestic currency debt. Some 
emerging economies’ ability to issue local currency debt is underpinned principally by their larger 
nominal GDP. In contrast, the level of development, institutional quality, monetary credibility, fiscal 
solvency, low public debt, exchange rate flexibility and the depth of domestic markets all display a weak 
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effect on international ‘Original Sin’. Hausmann and Panizza thus concur that ‘Original Sin’ persists 
over extended periods, as the process of establishing policy credibility is long. In countries that have 
experienced some moderation in international ‘Original Sin’, such as the Czech Republic, Hong Kong, 
Singapore and South Africa, multinational institutions issue local currency bonds and swap the proceeds 
and future obligations into reserve currencies. They thus propose that multilateral efforts, such as 
launching a basket of emerging economy local currency bonds, are the only sure way to recover from 
‘Original Sin’.  
Regarding domestic ‘Original Sin’, Hausmann and Panizza argue that monetary credibility and the 
imposition of capital controls expand the domestic investor base and thus attenuate its effects. The 
prevalence of international ‘Original Sin’, however, does not signal the presence of domestic Original 
Sin. The inability to borrow domestically over the long-term and at fixed rates is a symptom of 
international ‘Original Sin’ because foreign investors seldom demand local-currency debt where local 
capital markets are not well-developed. Hence, redemption from domestic ‘Original Sin’ does not 
signify the ability to borrow offshore in domestic currency, which supports the deduction of Eichengreen 
and Hausmann (1999) that deep and liquid local capital markets are the prerequisite for, but do not 
signal, redemption from international ‘Original Sin’.  
Cohen (2005) attributes ‘Original Sin’ in both industrialised and emerging economies to currency 
stability and relative interest rates. Strong and high interest rate currencies are found to attract higher 
bond inflows compared with their peers. EME currency denomination is inhibited by the shallowness 
of domestic currency capital markets and limited exchange rate hedging instruments, hence the 
incidence of currency mismatches.  
In response to studies countering this hypothesis, Hausmann and Panizza (2010) augment the work of 
Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) and that of Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza (2003a and 2003b) 
that covered the period 1993 to 2001 to include global debt data up to 2008. Applying BIS data on 
international bonds and US Treasury figures on US dollar-based investors’ holdings of foreign-issued 
debt to two of the three indices of ‘Original Sin’, originally developed by Eichengreen, Hausmann and 
Panizza (2003a), they find global bond issuance to be still dominated by reserve currencies, which 
accounted for 96% of currency denomination, while residents of these economies accounted for only 
85% of bond issuance. The key findings reflect modest reductions in the incidence of international 
‘Original Sin’, as only a few economies managed to increase their capacity to borrow internationally in 
local currency. The share of bonds issued in reserve currencies by the rest of the world declined from 
90% in 1999 to a still high 75% in 2008, while only seven of the 65 developing economies analysed 
issued at least 15% of their debt in local currency. Moreover, domestic bond issuance is found to be 
more long-term and at fixed-rates, while the reliance on foreign-currency debt declined as evidenced by 
lower stock of gross and net foreign debt. Aggregate currency mismatches moderated, and policy 
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flexibility improved, but these were attributed to less external borrowing and the accumulation of 
foreign-exchange reserves more than an improved capacity to borrow in domestic currency. Despite 
these positive developments, participation of foreign investors in local currency bond markets remained 
limited. Hausmann and Panizza thus conclude that ‘Original Sin’ is still widely prevalent.  
The literature on ‘Original Sin’ posits that a large economic size is the precondition for a deep and liquid 
domestic credit market. In addition, the ability to borrow abroad in local currency is found to be a 
function of the reserve status of the local currency. The usability of a wider basket of currencies is 
inhibited by transaction costs, and hence countries that borrow internationally are beleaguered by 
currency mismatches. The accumulation of net foreign debt complicates the pursuit of macroeconomic 
stability through the balance-sheet effects of exchange rate depreciations, while adopting reserve 
currencies or pegging the local currency also inhibits policy flexibility. ‘Original Sin’ is not restricted 
to emerging economies as it has prevailed in some developed economies over long periods. Restrictions 
on domestic capital flows are found to moderate domestic ‘Original Sin’, although deep and liquid 
domestic markets do not necessarily attenuate the incidence of international ‘Original Sin’. Policy 
efforts would, without multilateral measures to promote emerging market local-currency debt 
instruments in international markets, fail to remedy the effects of ‘Original Sin’ expeditiously. Some 
countries improved their capacity to borrow in domestic currency in both international and domestic 
markets, but the improvement was negligible, hence ‘Original Sin’ is still widely prevalent. 
Research that rejects the hypothesis, however, accentuates the role of factors besides country size and 
currency stability in LCBM development, and the merits of global financial integration. 
2.3 Macroeconomic and institutional determinants of bond market development 
Numerous studies counter the ‘Original Sin’ hypothesis by emphasising the significance of both 
endogenous and exogenous factors for the capacity of emerging economies to develop government and 
corporate bond markets. The determinants of LCBM development are split into macroeconomic and 
institutional factors – creditor-friendly policies and creditor-friendly laws (Burger and Warnock, 2006a). 
Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2004) argue that the determinants of LCBM can be categorised 
into four groups. Structural factors are nominal GDP size and trade openness. Financial factors include 
banking sector depth and the interest-rate spread. Developmental factors are the level of income per 
capita and the institutional framework, while the macroeconomic factors encompass the overall fiscal 
balance, the interest rate, exchange-rate flexibility and the capital controls regime.  
Most papers distinguish the determinants into only macroeconomic and institutional factors by 
aggregating the four factors. Structural, financial and developmental factors are combined into 
macroeconomic determinants, and the list expands to include monetary policy credibility, proxied by 
the inflation rate, and GDP growth rate. Institutional factors relate mainly to the rule of law and investor 
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protection regulations. The breadth of the investor base, comprising of both domestic and foreign 
investors, signifies the extent of redemption from ’Original Sin’. A diverse domestic investor base with 
a large non-bank sector is an indicator of redemption from domestic ‘Original Sin’, while global investor 
demand reflects the extent of redemption from international ‘Original Sin’. The distinction into 
macroeconomic and institutional factors however, is not strictly adhered to as, for instance, investor 
demand can be a function of both structural and institutional factors. Additionally, the list is not 
exhaustive, with researchers adding factors according to their relevance to a particular approach. 
Ceccheti and Krause (2001) adopt a broad focus on conditions that facilitate aggregate financial 
development. A study of the connection between higher macroeconomic stability and financial structure 
across 23 developed and developing economies over two periods – 1982 to 1989 and 1990 to 1997 – 
finds support for the view that financial development, exhibited by central-bank independence and less 
government intervention in the financial sector through less direct ownership of banking assets, boosts 
monetary policy effectiveness and improves the stability of inflation and economic output variability. 
The study, however, cautions that deposit insurance could prompt a reliance on bank credit more than 
capital markets and in that way inhibit the development of alternative sources of finance. 
Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2004) explore debt issued by local residents and targeted at the 
domestic investor base in 41 developed and EMEs for the period 1990 to 2001, focusing on Asian 
emerging economies. The panel GLS regression finds that although there is evidence of a “minimum 
efficient scale” required for LCBM development, the link with economic size proves to be tenuous. The 
level of economic development or income level – proxied by GDP per capita – reflects a more significant 
role. Exchange rate stability and large banking systems have a positive association with LCBMs, strong 
fiscal balances impede the bond market by limiting public debt issuance, and weak institutional 
governance weighs down principally on corporate debt issuance. Exchange controls are found to inhibit 
foreign participation in LCBMs and thus constrain their development. 
Mehl and Reynaud (2005) reject the Hausmann and Panizza (2003) approach that capital controls 
moderate the prevalence of domestic ‘Original Sin’. An analysis of a broader sample of 33 countries 
over the period 1994 to 2004 applies a random-effects tobit estimation to develop an empirical 
framework independent of the determinants of international ‘Original Sin’, and expands macroeconomic 
and institutional factors to the structure of interest rates and the debt burden. High inflation, an inverted 
yield curve – depicted by short-term interest rates that are higher than long-term rates – an elevated debt 
service-to-GDP ratio and a low private savings-to-GDP ratio are all found to impede the ability to 
develop domestic fixed-interest markets. The study concludes that developing LCBMs is not a 
necessarily long process as sound macroeconomic policies, attractive long-term yields and policies to 
expand the domestic investor base are found to swiftly boost LCBMs. Thus, domestic ‘Original Sin’ is 
not an inherent characteristic of emerging economies and can be overcome by appropriate policies. 
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Burger and Warnock (2006a) utilise a more comprehensive set of 2001 public and private bonds of 49 
developed and developing economies issued in both domestic and international markets to underline the 
contribution of prudent domestic policies. An OLS regression that controls for the interdependence 
between inflation, fiscal-deficit financing and bond market depth gives results that are consistent with 
prior studies. Macroeconomic variables and institutional factors – primarily the quality of rule of law 
and creditor rights – reflect a positive association with LCBM and banking system size. Public and 
private debt markets are subject to the same determinants, with the extent of government borrowing in 
particular being significant for the size of the government bond market. The results show that budget 
deficits impact private bond issuance through the inflation channel – inflationary deficit financing stunts 
the development of private bond markets, while monetary policy credibility is also significant for the 
development of a private bond market. Burger and Warnock thus conclude that better policies and laws 
foster LCBM development, reduce currency mismatches and limit the incidence of financial crises, 
while the development of banking and bond markets is found to be complementary. The results therefore 
suggest that ‘Original Sin’ is not an inherent characteristic of emerging economies. 
Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2006) expand their 2004 study by incorporating foreign bond 
inflows to analyse the determinants of foreign investor participation in LCBMs. The study focuses on 
bond flows to East Asia using International Monetary Fund data on bilateral international portfolio 
holdings of long-term debt for the years 2001 to 2003. The results of a gravity model, which predicts 
bilateral capital flows based on economic size and distance between countries, shows that economic size 
of the source and destination markets is significant, but not a prerequisite, for LCBM development. 
Local credit ratings, as well as the institutional framework display a positive association. Bond flows 
are negatively associated with the source country interest rate fluctuations and the volatility of the 
bilateral exchange rate, while capital controls are found to restrict flows in both directions. 
Burger and Warnock (2006b) examine data on US dollar-based investors’ holdings of local currency 
bonds across 41 developed and emerging economies for 1998 to 2001. The study constructs a simple 
model of global portfolio allocation in which the mean, variance and skewness of bond returns influence 
investors’ holdings, in line with the work of Harvey et al. (2003). The results indicate that US investors 
shun bonds with volatile and negatively skewed returns. More prudent macroeconomic policies (to the 
extent that they limit the volatility and negative skewness of US-dollar returns of local bonds) help to 
improve the diversification benefits of LCBMs and thus attract foreign investors into local currency 
bonds. It is thus concluded that prudent macroeconomic policies can trigger a virtuous circle in which 
the attractiveness of LCBMs leads to further deepening of domestic capital markets by boosting foreign 
investor demand.  
Claessens, Klingebiel and Schmukler (2007) extend the analysis of the determinants of government 
bond market development and the currency composition thereof to include short-term debt instruments, 
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and apply a dynamic regression to instruments across the maturity curve, from Treasury bills to long-
term bonds in 35 developed economies and EMEs for the period 1993 to 2000. Consistent with the 
‘Original Sin’ hypothesis, the results show a strong positive association between local and foreign 
currency bond issuance and nominal GDP. Countries with less developed domestic financial markets 
are found to be more reliant on foreign-currency financing. The findings affirm that EMEs are highly 
‘debt-intolerant’, but the inability to issue domestic-currency debt, however, extends beyond size and 
domestic market depth. The inflation rate, the strength of the fiscal position, monetary policy credibility 
and capital account openness are inversely associated with LCBM development, while exchange rate 
flexibility has a positive association. Emerging economies with inflexible exchange rate regimes are 
found to have less developed domestic currency bond markets. Hence, institutional and macroeconomic 
conditions prove to be significant for the broadening of the domestic investor base. 
Peiris (2010) conducts a panel data estimation of bond data of 10 large emerging economies for which 
foreigners’ holdings of local bonds were disclosed, over the period 2000 to 2009. The results show that 
foreign participation is a beneficial condition for LCBM development. Bond yields fall and become less 
volatile, market liquidity and efficiency improve, while the institutional framework strengthens in the 
long run. However, sudden stops and withdrawals of capital flows often result in local bond market 
instability, although a GARCH model reflects inconclusive evidence on the contribution of foreign 
participation to the volatility of financial markets. Thus, although foreign participation increases the 
susceptibility of domestic markets to global shocks, it is found to be generally beneficial for domestic 
capital markets. 
Burger, Warnock and Warnock (2010) expand the work of Burger and Warnock (2006a and 2006b) 
using US Treasury data of 2008 USD-based investors’ holdings of foreign bonds of 47 economies to 
assess the fundamental factors supporting the attractiveness of local currency bonds to these investors. 
Using a Bayesian decision theoretic framework of Harvey et al. (2010) they find that lower inflation 
volatility and stronger legal rights stimulate foreign-investor demand for local-currency debt 
instruments, enhances emerging-market returns, and lengthens the maturity profile of domestic debt 
through various channels. For instance, exchange rate stability enhances foreign currency returns of 
local currency bonds. In the absence of capital controls the diversification benefit of EME bonds is 
elevated, which helps to attract flows from US dollar-based investors, thus broadening the investor base. 
Consequently, Burger, Warnock and Warnock (2010) conclude that emerging economies with better 
macroeconomic stability and stronger institutional frameworks “pull’ US-dollar based capital.  
Miyajima et al. (2015) similarly shows that favourable macroeconomic conditions and institutional 
frameworks improve the attractiveness of EME assets. The study examines monthly bond yield data for 
11 EMEs – including South Africa – with sizable LCBM and significant foreign investor holdings for 
the period January 2000 to May 2014. The fixed-effect, static panel framework confirms that improved 
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macroeconomic stability, reflected by more stable EME bond yields, has moderated the volatility of 
asset returns. Changes in global factors, proxied by changes in US long-term interest rates, have a 
positive but diminishing effect, while investor sentiment on its own proved to have an insignificant 
influence. The dynamic panel VAR model reflects the positive effect of stronger institutions and better 
market infrastructure on market depth. Since the 2008 global financial crisis foreign capital inflows have 
proven to be less responsive to higher global risk aversion and tighter global monetary conditions, 
factors that have historically inhibited such flows. The allure of EME bonds as an alternative asset class 
for advanced-economy bonds has thus risen. The paper predicted that a more stable global 
macroeconomic environment and the hunt for yield on the back of persistently low interest rates in the 
major developed markets would continue to drive demand for EME assets. The theory of ‘Original Sin’ 
is thus losing its robustness as capital is pushed to emerging economies’ LCBMs.  
Park (2016) regresses quarterly data to analyse the influence of economic factors on the size and local-
currency share of public and corporate bond markets in 10 Asian economies over the period 1996 to 
2015. Consistent with the results of Burger and Warnock (2006a), bond market capitalisation-to-GDP 
shows a strong positive association with economic size and currency composition. The fiscal balance, 
bank credit extension, sovereign credit rating and quality of rule of law have a positive association. 
Inflation significantly hampers bond market size, although the effect on local-currency share proved 
insignificant due to the significantly positive effect of exchange rate flexibility. The regression of 
corporate bond market data reflected similar results for most independent variables. However, inflation 
has a negative effect on the maturity profile, exchange rate flexibility is insignificant for duration, while 
the availability of short-term bank loans shortens the maturity profile of corporate bonds. Park thus 
concludes that better macroeconomic management and rule of law stimulate local-currency government 
and corporate bond issuance.  
A few studies focus on the relationship between inflation and bond markets in inflation targeting 
economies. Rose (2014) estimates the association between inflation and local-currency bond markets in 
32 countries with an explicit inflation target, utilising data over the period 1970 to 2012. Inflation 
targeting economies with bond markets are found to experience inflation that is three to four percentage 
points lower compared with inflation targeters without bond markets. Hence, although inflation targeters 
already reflect lower inflation than non-inflation targeters, the existence of a market for long-maturity 
fixed-rate nominal bonds helps to lower the inflation rate even further. This suggests that bond market 
development reinforces macroeconomic stability.  
Ogrokhina and Rodriguez (2016) conducted a comprehensive study on the contribution of inflation 
targeting to debt denomination in developing economies. They empirically examined the currency 
denomination of internationally-issued debt of all borrowers in 75 inflation targeting and non-inflation 
targeting developing economies over the period 1994 to 2003. In addition to findings that are similar to 
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those of prior studies regarding the various control variables, inflation targeting economies are found to 
reduce their foreign-currency debt denomination by three percentage points faster than non-inflation 
targeting countries, while countries with a fixed inflation target reduce their foreign currency-
denominated debts more than countries with a flexible target. Thus, monetary credibility in the form of 
a commitment to an inflation target is found to contribute to the ability of developing countries to issue 
local currency debt in international markets.  
Thus in summary, the literature on the determinants of LCBM development generally rejects the main 
arguments of the ‘Original Sin’ hypothesis on the basis that the ability to issue domestic-currency debt 
to both international and domestic investors is not primarily determined by country size. Instead, 
improvements in macroeconomic stability and the institutional framework are found to assuage the 
effects of ‘Original Sin’ and help to develop LCBMs. Reforms that mobilise institutional savings, 
extending participation to foreign investors and the development of risk management instruments help 
to expand the investor base, while regulatory measures to improve secondary market liquidity also boost 
the demand for local-currency bonds. Foreign investor participation is found to be beneficial for LCBM 
development as extending access to foreign investors expands the investor base and helps to moderate 
domestic ‘Original Sin’, a significant development in the quest to overcome ‘Original Sin’. The role of 
explicit inflation targeting is found to boost policy credibility and thus support the demand for local 
currency long-term bonds. 
2.4 Local currency bond markets in Sub-Saharan Africa 
The majority of SSA is low-income economies that have been extremely dependent on concessional 
external financing. The subcontinent’s domestic debt markets are characterised by short-term maturity 
structures, limited capitalisation and narrow domestic investor bases due to low levels of per capita 
income (Christensen, 2004). Bond markets are thus small and illiquid relative to banking and equity 
markets, and compared with the other developing regions (Khan, 2005; Andrianaivo and Yartey, 2009; 
Allen et al., 2011). Khan (2005) pinpoints the high prevalence of domestic ‘Original Sin’, with SSA 
domestic debt markets shown to be shallow and the average maturity of public debt being less than one 
year. There is therefore a need to develop domestic sources of long-term finance, a sine qua non that is 
accentuated by declining volumes of concessional loans and lower foreign aid (Adelegan and 
Radzewicz-Bak, 2009).  
Many SSA economies have gained access to global markets in recent decades, but the borrowing is 
overwhelmingly denominated in foreign currency. According to Gevorkyan and Kvangraven (2016), 14 
SSA economies have issued US dollar and euro denominated international bonds totalling more than 
USD15 billion since 2006. The study develops empirical models suitable for panels with missing data 
to secondary bond market yields of nine SSA economies from 2006 to 2014 to assess the determinants 
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of borrowing costs in SSA. The study finds that international ‘Original Sin’ is still widely persistent in 
SSA, while foreign debt accumulation precipitates the inability of SSA economies to cope with debt 
levels that are easily manageable for developed economies and raises the need to accumulate foreign 
exchange reserves to limit currency mismatches. Borrowing costs of commodity-dependent, first-time 
sovereign issuers in international markets are found to be driven by global factors, mainly investor 
sentiment, commodity prices and liquidity. Gevorkyan and Kvangraven conclude that SSA economies 
should take advantage of favourable global conditions to advance macroeconomic reforms and thus 
reduce their external vulnerability. The study consequently agrees with the literature that advocates for 
improvements in macroeconomic and institutional structures to boost the capacity to borrow 
internationally in local currency and develop domestic credit markets.  
Despite the need to develop domestic bond markets in SSA, comprehensive literature that analyses the 
development of both public and corporate bond markets in SSA is limited to just a few studies, which 
are reviewed below.  
Adelegan and Radzewicz-Bak (2009) apply the panel data approach of Eichengreen and 
Luengnaruemitchai (2004) to the analysis of government and corporate bond markets of 23 SSA 
economies over the period 1990 to 2008. The GMM model finds that no variable is singularly significant 
for the development of domestic bond markets. The depth of the domestic financial sector and the level 
of private savings prove a positive association with LCBM development. A M2-to-GDP ratio above 
50% generally exhibited a higher level of domestic long-term public debt-to-GDP. The level and 
volatility of interest rates, exchange-rate volatility and capital controls have a significant negative 
association. At a disaggregated level, public and private bond market development are negatively related 
to interest-rate and exchange-rate volatility, and capital controls as well as the size of the budget balance, 
while institutional factors including the investment climate and bureaucratic quality were also 
significant for the latter. Private bond issuance is determined principally by the level of economic 
development and the size of the banking sector, which both displayed a positive relationship. 
Mu et al. (2013) apply a two-phase estimation technique under fixed effects and GMM estimation to a 
larger sample of government securities and corporate bond markets in 36 SSA economies over the years 
1980 to 2010. Nominal GDP size is found to have a negative association with the public debt market 
under the fixed effects analysis, but this is contrasted by the GMM model’s positive relation, which is 
consistent with earlier studies. The cost of bank credit, budget balance, exchange-rate volatility and 
financial account openness have a negative effect, while English legal origin, strong institutional and 
governance frameworks, and low domestic interest-rate volatility are conducive to LCBM development. 
The results of the sample of 24 corporate bond markets points to the significance of fewer variables 
relative to the public bond market, probably due to the public debt market having a significant influence 
on the private market. In addition to economic size and GDP per capita, the private sector credit-to-GDP 
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ratio and capital account openness have a significant and positive association. Trade openness has a 
negative association with both public and private markets, while the effect of land area is ambiguous. 
The GMM results thus confirm the significance of macroeconomic factors for both government and 
private bond markets, with economic size and the level of development significant and positively related 
to LCBM development. The deduction that well-functioning credit markets facilitate economic stability 
is consistent with the “supply-leading” hypothesis. 
Berensmann, Dafe and Volz (2015) utilise the African Financial Markets Initiative3 (AFMI) database of 
treasury bonds of 27 SSA sovereigns over the period of 2007 to 2012. The one-year lag of the control 
variables tests whether changes in the dependent variable are influenced by changes in the latter, 
although this approach does not test for the direction of causality. The study found significant positive 
relationships between LCBM size and macroeconomic and institutional factors consistent with the 
results of Mu et al. (2013), Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2004) and Claessens et al. (2007). The 
level of economic development, however, was insignificant when Mauritius and South Africa were 
excluded, while a large stock of foreign exchange reserves was found to negate the need to borrow in 
domestic markets. Exchange rate volatility – measured by the five-year rolling standard deviation of the 
log of the exchange rate against the US dollar – showed a positive coefficient, although it was not 
significant. Thus, contrary to the prior studies, macroeconomic stability – also proxied by inflation – 
was found to be insignificant for LCBM development. 
Essers, Blommestein, Cassimon and Ibarlucea (2016) utilise the OECD (2013) dataset of 15 SSA bond 
markets for the period 2003 to 2012 to analyse the key drivers of LCBM capitalisation. Consistent with 
the objective of assessing the determinants of local-currency-denominated bond market development, 
the panel data framework deviates from that of Mu et al. (2013) by excluding domestically-issued 
foreign currency instruments. The results generally accord with those of Mu et al. (2013) in the sense 
that macroeconomic variables overall reflect similar associations with LCBM development. The two-
step GMM estimations validate the significance of economic size to LCBM development through the 
broad domestic investor base, economies of scale and the attractiveness to foreign investors. Larger 
fiscal balances and lower inflation, as well as higher institutional quality boost government LCBM 
capitalisation. Thus, lower fiscal balances are generally found to constrain LCBM size. Other 
government debt is found to have a negative correlation, although the coefficient is insignificant. The 
study adds the nature of the political arrangement to institutional factors and finds that stronger 
democratic political systems are positively associated with LCBM capitalisation. Thus, consistent with 
the conclusions of Adelegan and Radzewicz-Bak (2009) and Mu et al. (2013), Essers et al. (2016) finds 
                                                          
3 The African Financial Markets Initiative is the African Development Bank’s programme to further develop domestic debt 
markets on the continent by strengthening domestic bond market infrastructure and investing in local currency denominated 
debt www.africanbondmarkets.org  
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that macroeconomic stability and higher institutional quality positively contribute to LCBM 
development.  
Dafe, Essers and Volz (2017) extend the analysis to data on bond tenors and bond yields of 28 SSA 
economies over the period of 2000 to 2014 drawn from the AFMI database. POLS and fixed effects 
regression analyses show the influence of macroeconomic and institutional variables similar to the 
results of Mu et al. (2013) and Berensmann et al. (2015). Bond durations are longer where overall 
financial development is deeper and governments are credible, and are negatively associated with 
inflation. Bond yields – of a sample of 14 countries – are higher in smaller, lower income countries with 
shallow financial markets, and have a strong positive relationship with inflation, high fiscal deficits and 
concentrated banking sectors. Generally, deeper LCBMs facilitate the lengthening of bond tenors while 
longer bond tenors are associated with lower yields. 
Thus in summary, the few studies that focus on SSA economies reach conclusions that conform to those 
of research focused on other regions. Sound macroeconomic management and better institutional 
governance positively contribute to local currency bond market development in SSA. Although African 
countries are increasingly floating fixed-rate local currency bonds with an initial duration of at least 10 
years, investor bases are still dominated by commercial banks, corporate bond issues remain scarce and 
secondary bond market liquidity is limited. Some SSA economies have gained access to international 
markets in recent years. The international borrowing, however, is still overwhelmingly denominated in 
foreign currency. The situation thus emphasises the need for LCBM development as the region faces 
declining sources of foreign assistance.  
2.5  Conclusion of the literature review 
The literature underlines the clear divide regarding the basis of the ability of emerging economies to 
borrow internationally in domestic currency and long term and at fixed rates domestically. The ‘Original 
Sin’ hypothesis ascribes the inability of some economies to borrow in domestic currency and long term 
in domestic markets to global factors that are exogenous to these economies. The views in the opposing 
literature heralds the contribution of prudent macroeconomic and sound institutional frameworks in 
boosting the capacity of economies to reduce their external vulnerability. 
Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) pioneered the ‘Original Sin’ hypothesis, which attributes the failure 
of some economies to borrow internationally in domestic currency to the dominance of reserve 
currencies in international capital flows. Emerging economies, which are characterised mainly by small 
economic size and shallow domestic bond markets that hinder their ability to issue local currency bonds 
in international markets, are afflicted by ‘Original Sin’. Studies find however that ‘Original Sin’ is not 
restricted to emerging economies only.  
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The opposing literature espouses improvements in macroeconomic management and institutional 
governance as enablers of emerging economies to develop LCBMs and the capacity to attract foreign 
capital inflows. Although GDP size determines the breadth of the domestic investor base and the 
attractiveness of the domestic market to foreign investors, it is generally found not to be a hindrance to 
LCBM capitalisation. Burger and Warnock (2006a) and Mu et al. (2013) are amongst studies that found 
banking and bond market development to be complementary, although macroeconomic stability and 
strong institutional governance are additional requisites for compensating investors for the risk of 
holding instruments whose returns are capped by associated interest rates. In contrast to Hausmann and 
Panizza (2003), capital controls are found to inhibit capital flows between source and destination 
economies and thus limit the development of LCBM in capital-scarce economies. As such, appropriate 
policy actions in EMEs help to broaden the domestic investor base and attract foreign investors, and 
thus foster the development of LCBM. Lower inflation facilitates the development of the local currency 
bond market, while the effectiveness of an inflation targeting policy is found to be reinforced by 
developed bond markets. 
The long history of ‘Original Sin’ in SSA economies has resulted in governments being reliant on short-
term domestic borrowing and foreign credit facilities. Khan (2005) finds ‘Original Sin’ to be persistent 
in SSA more so than in other regions, while Gevorkyan and Kvangraven (2016) shows that, although 
more SSA economies have gained international market access, the borrowing is still dominated by 
foreign currency debt. Declining foreign aid and concessional credit facilities magnify the need for the 
development of sufficiently deep and liquid domestic markets, which will attract foreign-investor 
participation. The results of studies on the determinants of bond markets in SSA reach conclusions that 
are similar to conclusions concerning other regions. Hence, advances in macroeconomic management 
and institutional government facilitate SSA bond market growth.  
While existing studies focus on the relationship between bond market development and institutional and 
macroeconomic factors, this study examines the contribution of explicit inflation targeting policies to 
the size of local currency fixed-interest debt, and consequently LCBM capitalisation in SSA. The study 
therefore utilises an inflation targeting framework instead of the volatility of the inflation rate.  
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Chapter 3: DATA DESCRIPTION AND METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Data description 
 
This study focuses on the significance of macroeconomic stability in facilitating demand for domestic 
debt securities issued by both public and private entities. Pradhan et al. (2015) identifies four dimensions 
of bond market development: domestic private debt securities; domestic public debt securities; 
international private debt securities and international public debt securities. This study is, however, 
restricted to local-currency denominated public and private debt securities to analyse the determinants 
of the ability of SSA economies to overcome ‘Original Sin’. 
The dependent variable is the ratio of outstanding central government bonds-to-GDP ratio (Gbonds). 
Similarly, the corporate bond market size is proxied by outstanding non-central government sector 
bonds-to-GDP ratio (Cbonds)4. 
For government bonds, data collection follows the approach of Essers et al. (2016) in utilising OECD 
data presented in the African Central Government Debt: Statistical Yearbook (hereafter referred to as 
the “African Debt Yearbook”), which presents figures on central government debt for the period of 2003 
to 2013. The database covers 17 African countries: Angola, Cameroon, Gabon, Kenya, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, 
Tunisia, Uganda and Zambia. The data is converted to US dollar values at end of year exchange rates 
drawn from the African Debt Yearbook. The OECD database is more comprehensive and reliable 
compared with BIS and IMF data utilised by Mu et al. (2013), which combined primary and secondary 
data, while large data gaps were found in the World Bank International Debt Statistics database. The 
AFMI database lists 40 African countries, 37 of which are in Sub-Saharan Africa, hence it is seemingly 
more extensive than the African Debt Yearbook. The AFMI, however, has no figures available for eight 
of the SSA economies, while it includes fixed-interest securities of short-term duration (1-year bonds) 
and has large data gaps over the period of 2000 to 2016 for most of the remaining countries. The OECD 
database is accordingly more suitable for a comprehensive study of SSA central government bond 
markets. 
This study draws data from OECD (2015), the fifth edition which covers data for 2003 to 2013, and 
therefore contains a sample consisting of 15 SSA economies for the following reasons: 
• The focus is only on SSA economies and thus Morocco and Tunisia are excluded.  
                                                          
4 Appendix A shows the date ranges of the dependent variable data. 
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• Sierra Leone is excluded as the government issues fixed-interest debt instruments with a 
maximum duration of only one year (OECD, 2015: 175).  
• Gabon is excluded from the sample due to the limited data series, as only 2008 and 2009 figures 
are available (OECD, 2015: 68). 
• For Namibia the OECD (2015) has central government marketable securities values from 2003 
to 2007 only. The Bank of Namibia Quarterly Bulletin contains figures of central government 
domestic debt internal registered stock5 for the period of 2001 to 2018, hence these are utilised 
in place of those in the African Debt Yearbook. Data differences between the two series are 
negligible for all but one of the years.  
• Data on Botswana and Ghana is added to augment the sample, as central government local 
currency bond market figures are available. Values for Botswana are obtained from the Bank of 
Botswana (2017) database, while for Ghana the data are from the Bank of Ghana Quarterly 
Bulletin6. The figures for Namibia, Botswana and Ghana thus conform to the OECD’s condition 
of primary data. 
Corporate bond market data consists of private bonds and fixed-interest, medium- to long-term debt 
issued by state-owned corporations. The sample is smaller than the central government sample due to 
the limited availability of these figures. Mu et al. (2013) indicates that with the possible exception of 
South Africa, corporate ownership is limited and there is dominance of state-owned entities in SSA 
economies, and as a result corporate LCBMs in SSA are virtually non-existent. This characteristic poses 
a challenge for the analysis of corporate bond markets, but the reasonable size of the corporate bond 
market in the middle-income SSA economies facilitates some basic analysis. Annual values of 
outstanding local-currency corporate bonds for the period 2006 to 2015 were drawn from Bloomberg. 
The sample includes Botswana, Namibia, Mauritius, Nigeria, Kenya, Mozambique, South Africa, 
Tanzania and Uganda. The figures incorporate bond liabilities of state-owned enterprises. 
Control Factors 
The independent variables have been selected in accordance with the studies that analyse the role of 
endogenous and exogenous variables in LCBM development reviewed in section 2.3. Data on the 
variables, which are discussed below, is drawn from the International Monetary Fund World Economic 
Outlook (October 2017) database, the World Bank Development Indicators and the relevant studies7. 
The figures are converted to their natural logarithms where applicable. 
 
                                                          
5 The Bank of Namibia describes these as fixed interest capital market instruments issued for longer maturities exceeding 12 
months and holders may earn half-yearly interest (coupon). 
6 Government of Ghana (GOG) fixed rate, limited duration, medium- to long-term local currency marketable debt instruments 
that pay interest at regular, specified intervals (excluding the 5-year Golden Jubilee bond). 
7 Information on the dependent and independent variables is presented in Appendix B. 
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Exchange rate volatility (EXRATE) 
Macroeconomic stability is defined as the low variability of key macroeconomic variables (Ceccheti 
and Krause 2001; World Bank, 2015). Asamoah, Adjasi and Alhassan (2016) define volatility as short-
term deviations of a variable relative to its long-term trend. World Bank (2015) lists macroeconomic 
variables as being the growth rate of real output, the inflation rate and the current account balance, while 
the overall fiscal deficit, interest rate variability and exchange rate volatility are classified as policy 
stability indicators. Cariolle (2012) stresses that the different indicators of macroeconomic volatility, 
based on stationary series, produce closely correlated results.  
This study thus utilises exchange rate volatility as an indicator of macroeconomic stability in accordance 
with Asamoah, Adjasi and Alhassan (2016). Volatility is measured by applying the general 
autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic GARCH (1,1) model of Bollerslev (1986), which is an 
extension of the autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic (ARCH) model of Engel (1982). The 
quarterly average exchange rate is utilised to derive the volatility series and the frequency of the series 
is converted to annual average values for each year. The study draws from the exchange rate 
classification of Ilzetzki, Reinhart and Rogoff (2017), which updates the work of Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2002)8. A value of one is assigned for the year when a country adopted a fixed exchange rate regime 
against a G7 currency. This is the case for Cameroon, which is a member of CEMAC – a monetary 
union whose common currency, the CFA franc, has been pegged to the euro at CFAfr655.96 since 
January 1999. A negative relationship between macroeconomic instability and demand for local 
currency bonds is expected, as volatility increases the uncertainty of future returns.  
Economic size (LogGDP) 
The nominal value of all economic activity within a particular year as measured by the log of nominal 
GDP (in US dollars) is an indicator of the overall size of the economy. Larger economies are generally 
found to have deeper financial markets and consequently it is expected that GDP will have a positive 
association with local currency bond market capitalisation. 
Level of income (LogINC) 
The level of income or economic development is measured by the log of GDP per capita in US dollars 
as per the approach of Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2004). Mehl and Reynaud (2005) used the 
gross private savings-to-GDP ratio as a proxy for the size of the domestic investor base. The depth of 
the domestic investor base is expected to display a positive relationship with the dependent factors in 
accordance with Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2004), Mehl and Reynaud (2005) Mu et al. 
(2013) and Berensmann et al. (2015).  
 
                                                          
8 The exchange rate regimes are summarised in Appendix C. 
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Banking sector depth (CRED) 
Banking and bond markets can be substitutes or complement each other (Mu et al., 2013; Essers et al., 
2016). A large banking system can serve as an incentive to finance government borrowing, or facilitate 
the functioning of the local currency bond market by acting as primary dealers and holders of domestic 
bonds (Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai, 2004). Bank credit, measured as the ratio of domestic 
credit (the aggregate of claims on central government debt and claims on private non-bank sectors) to 
GDP indicates the depth of the domestic credit market.  
Fiscal balance (BUDGET) 
Fiscal balance is measured as the variation of the central, instead of the general, government budget 
balance expressed as a ratio of GDP. General government borrowing includes debt issued by public and 
quasi-public enterprises, and these will be separated as per the approach of Mu et al. (2013). A three-
year moving average of the fiscal balance centred on the current year is utilised to smooth out the effect 
of transitory factors. The balance is the difference between fiscal revenue and total expenditure in a 
particular year. A positive relationship with the public bond market is expected as governments with 
large budget shortfalls need to borrow more than those with surpluses (Essers et al., 2016). However, a 
negative association with the dependent variable can arise as high fiscal deficits can inhibit demand for 
local currency sovereign bonds as expectations of default increase. Additionally, a large central 
government budget deficit crowds out the development of the corporate sector bond market by limiting 
the demand for higher-risk private bonds. 
Public debt service ratio (PDEBT) 
The debt service cost-to-GDP ratio of central government is used as a proxy for the debt burden in 
accordance with Mehl and Reynaud (2005). Total debt service includes interest payments only, and a 
higher debt service ratio pushes the risk premium to levels which make it unsustainable for governments 
to issue local currency debt and thus a negative association is expected. Mehl and Reynaud (2005) find 
that a one percentage point rise in the debt service-to-GDP ratio is associated with a 1.9 percentage point 
increase in the riskiness of public debt, and therefore it reduces investors’ appetite for such debt. 
Capital account openness (CAop) 
This variable captures access of international investors to domestic credit markets and local residents’ 
access to foreign bond markets, and therefore the breadth of the investor base. The study utilises the 
Bond Market sub-index, ka_bo, of the “Overall Capital Account Liberalisation Index” constructed by 
Jahan and Wang (2016) – the “Wang-Jahan Index”. The index is based on the International Monetary 
Fund’s Annual Reports on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER) data and is 
closely correlated with capital account indices developed by Schindler (2009) and Chinn and Ito (2011) 
(Jahan and Wang, 2016). The Bond Market sub-index indicates the degree of capital account openness 
to bond market holdings by non-resident investors and local residents’ holdings of offshore bonds. The 
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sub-index is an aggregate of four equally-weighted indicators which measure the ability of non-residents 
to hold local bonds and to issue bonds in local markets, and local residents’ ability to hold foreign bonds 
and issue bonds in foreign markets. The scores range from 0 for a fully restricted bond market to 1 for 
a fully liberalised market. The data, however, is not available for Cameroon9. Capital account openness 
is found to expand the investor base (Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai, 2006; Burger, Warnock and 
Warnock, 2010) while Ogrokhina and Rodriguez (2016) find that it reduces the share of foreign currency 
debt, hence a positive association with local currency bond market capitalisation is expected.  
Institutional quality indicator (INST) 
Although there is no consensus on the definition of governance and institutional quality, there are cross-
country variables that are applied as barometers of the quality of governance (Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Mastruzz, 2010). Thus, the World Bank Governance Indicators “Rule of Law” sub-index is used as a 
proxy for institutional quality. A score of 2.5 indicates strong governance and -2.5 points to weak 
governance. Consistent with the findings of Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2006), Adelegan and 
Radzewicz-Bak (2009), and Essers et al. (2016) a positive association with LCBM market is expected 
as good governance and strong institutional quality engender investor demand for domestic investment 
instruments. 
Global factor (Gfactor - π) 
Global market conditions are key determinants of global financial flows and therefore global demand 
for emerging market financial assets (Lo Duca, 2012). Gevorkyan and Kvangraven (2016), Essers et al. 
(2016) and Dafe et al. (2017) utilise the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (VIX) – a 
benchmark measure of global investor sentiment calculated from stock index option prices – as a 
measure of common global conditions. Lo Duca (2012) utilises a broader measure which averages 
changes in volatility of the benchmark United States equity index (VIX) and the benchmark European 
equity index (VDAX). Following the approach of Lo Duca (2012), changes in the level of an equally-
weighted composite index of annual figures of VIX and VDAX are applied as a measure of a common 
global factor that influences flows to EME LCBMs, with each year’s value expressed as a ratio of the 
previous year’s value. A higher value indicates heightened global risk aversion, and hence lower demand 
for emerging market assets. Therefore, a negative relationship with the dependent variable is expected. 
This variable helps to capture the influence of ample global liquidity and low interest rates in the major 
industrialised economies i.e. “push” factors.  
 
Inflation targeting framework (INFT) 
                                                          
9 Data on the Bond Market sub-index was obtained from the co-author, Sarwat Jahan, in November 2017. 
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Inflation targeting is utilised as a measure of monetary credibility. Monetary credibility can be defined 
as the extent to which the monetary authority is committed to meet its monetary policy objectives, as 
assessed by various economic agents (Kabundi and Mlachila, 2018). The hallmark of the inflation 
targeting policy is the stated numerical target for inflation as either a single point or a range, which 
defines the monetary policy goal against which the central bank’s mandate is appraised (Bernanke and 
Mishkin, 1999; Kahn, 2008; Ogrokhina and Rodriguez, 2016). Mishkin (2000) lists five elements of an 
inflation targeting framework, which extend beyond the public announcement of a numerical target for 
inflation. Similarly, Carare and Stone (2005) characterise “full-fledged inflation targeting” as 
encompassing a clear commitment to inflation targeting by establishing an institutional framework that 
supports a transparent monetary policy framework. Accordingly, local currency bond market 
capitalisation will be examined for a subsample of economies whose inflation targeting regimes are 
consistent with the characterisation of Mishkin (2000)10. Hausmann and Panizza (2003) contend that 
monetary credibility helps to counter the effects of domestic ‘Original Sin’, Mehl and Reynaud (2005) 
stressed that monetary credibility is a major determinant of public debt demand, while Ogrokhina and 
Rodriguez (2016) found that inflation targeting economies are more able to issue local currency debt in 
international markets, hence a positive association between monetary credibility and LCBM 
development is expected. INFT is a dummy variable with a value of 1 assigned for the year in which the 
country adopted "full-fledged" inflation targeting framework, otherwise 0. 
3.2 Econometric framework 
This research applies a dynamic model to determine the strength of the relationship between 
macroeconomic stability and local currency bond markets.  
Miyajima et al. (2015) build on the premise that EME domestic bond markets have developed, whereas 
Mu et al. (2013) focus on the capacity of EMEs to develop LCBM. This research adopts the approach 
of the latter as available research indicates that SSA bond markets are still underdeveloped relative to 
the rest of the world. 
This study is expected to affirm that macroeconomic stability is significant for the development of 
LCBM in SSA, as illustrated by the studies reviewed in sections 2.3 and 2.4. These studies analysed the 
influence of both macroeconomic and institutional factors to the development of LCBMs. This study 
seeks to contribute to the body of research in this area, with a particular focus on SSA.  
3.3 Specification of the model 
The statistical approach follows the dynamic system GMM model (Arellano and Bond, 1991) applied 
by Mu et al. (2013) and Essers et al. (2016) to account for time variant and time invariant variables. 
Andrianaivo and Yartey (2009) stress that when there is a correlation between country-specific effects 
                                                          
10 The inflation targeting economies are listed in Appendix D. 
 25 
 
 
and the control factors least squares methods (OLS and GLS) are not able to observe the assumption of 
strict endogeneity. The GMM model helps to observe this condition and the orthogonality condition 
between the error term and the regressors. In the GMM model of Arellano and Bond (1991) first 
differencing eliminates the unobserved heterogeneity and then uses the orthogonality condition between 
the lagged values of the dependent variable and the disturbances of the error term ϵi,t – ϵi,t-1 to derive an 
estimator (Andrianaivo and Yartey, 2009).  
The Arellano-Bond (1991) two-step estimator GMM model will therefore estimate the dynamic model. 
This will account for endogeneity between the dependent and independent variables and among 
independent variables relevant to bond market development such as the size of the budget deficit, 
banking sector credit and interest payments on government debt. Wooldridge (2001) stresses that the 
GMM approach is more suited for more sophisticated panel data with serial correlations, and thus 
accounts for endogeneity – when the control variables are correlated – in cases where the distribution 
of the dependent variable is unknown.  
The explanatory variables are lagged where necessary to get explanatory power of the independent 
variable. A similar approach is followed by Berensmann et al. (2015) and Essers et al. (2016). 
The model takes the following form: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0𝑌𝑖,𝑡−𝑥 + 𝛽1𝑌𝑖,𝑡−𝑥 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑋𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑖,𝑡−𝑥 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡−𝑥 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑖,𝑡−𝑥
+ 𝛽5𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡−𝑥 + 𝛽6𝐵𝑈𝐷𝐺𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡−𝑥 + 𝛽7𝑃𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑖,𝑡−𝑥 + 𝛽8𝐶𝐴𝑜𝑝𝑖,𝑡−𝑥
+ 𝛽9INST𝑖,𝑡−𝑥 + 𝛽10𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑇𝑖,𝑡−𝑥 + γπ𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜐𝑖,𝑡  
            (1) 
 
𝜐𝑖,𝑡 =σ𝑖,𝑡(ξ𝑖,𝑡 + Øξ𝑖,𝑡 − 1) 
,    
𝜎2𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜎
2
𝑖,𝑡Ө0 + Ө1𝑥
2
𝑖,𝑡  
      (x is a vector of the independent variables) 
where    𝜂𝑖~i. i. d. 𝑁(0, 𝜎
2𝜂), ξ𝑖,𝑡~i. i. d. 𝑁(0,1) and 𝑌𝑖,𝑡  =  0 
Yi,t is the dependent variable, the size of the local currency bond market, measured as the market 
capitalisation in US dollar terms of the nominal value of local currency bonds in issue relative to the 
size of the economy as measured by nominal gross domestic product (GDP); i and t represent the cross-
sectional country unit and time period respectively; Yi,t-x is the x period lag of the dependent variable that 
controls for the cumulative influence of LCBM capitalisation in previous years as per the approach of 
Essers et al. (2016) and Dafe et al. (2017). Changes in domestic policy measures such as interest rates 
impact other economic variables and are thus included (this excludes the global factor) to account for 
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the effect of policy changes on LCBM development. LCBM development is thus a cumulative process, 
with bond market capitalisation in period t proving to be to a degree dependent on capitalisation in the 
period t-1; ηi is the country-specific fixed effect which accounts for unobservable heterogeneity such 
that E(ηi) = 0 and var (ηi) = σ
2
η and ξ𝑖,𝑡t is the error term with E(ξ𝑖,𝑡) = 0. 
Sensitivity and robustness tests will follow the approach of Mu et al. (2013) whereby the GMM 
estimation will be applied to sub-samples which will exclude the following countries: 
• The relatively high market capitalisation economies – Mauritius and South Africa – as per the 
approach of Berensmann et al. (2015) and Essers et al. (2016). These countries have to some 
extent overcome ‘Original Sin’ (Khan, 2005) and have attracted foreign inflows into bond 
markets more than the relatively lower LCBM capitalisation economies. 
• Fragile states, selected according to the World Bank’s Low-income countries under stress list 
(LICUS) which has been compiled since 2006. Bua, Pradelli and Presbitero (2014) stress that 
the high dependence of low-income economies on foreign financing – primarily concessional 
borrowing – raised their vulnerability to adverse global shocks, while the OECD (2014) 
highlights the fact that fragile states have limited capacity to mobilise domestic resources. 
Therefore, a country which was on the LICUS list for at least two years over the sample period 
is regarded as fragile for the purposes of this study; hence, Angola, Cameroon and Nigeria are 
classified as such11.  
 
The White (1980) test to examine for the covariance of the parameters and heteroscedasticity of the sub-
samples and the Durbin-Watson test of for autocorrelation in the residuals will be conducted. The Sargan 
test for over-identifying restrictions (Arellano and Bond, 1991) and the Arellano Bond AR(2) test for 
estimation consistency will be conducted.  
 
  
                                                          
11 The fragile states are summarised in Appendix E. 
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Chapter 4: DATA LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
 
4.1  Data limitations and assumptions 
 
The study encountered the following data limitations which compelled some assumptions to be made. 
4.1.1 Data limitations 
• The limited availability of data on local currency bond markets in SSA restricts such studies to 
a few countries and limited time periods. The OECD (2015) database provides data for 15 
countries for the period of 2003 to 2013, thus the analysis of central government LCBM 
development is limited to that period. The database, however, is sufficient for a comprehensive 
econometric study. Data gaps are estimated utilising methods that are explained below. 
• Corporate bond market data drawn from Bloomberg exhibited large data gaps, thus the OLS-
PCSE is applied. Tanzania and Uganda are excluded from the sample due to limited data. For 
Botswana and Nigeria, figures drawn from the Botswana Stock Exchange and Nkwede et al. 
(2016) respectively, are used to fill gaps in the Bloomberg series. Outliers are smoothed by 
replacing them with a three-year average centred on the outlier year.  
• The availability of data of some of the independent variables for up to only 2015 limits the 
sample period, and so the corporate bond market analysis will be for the period 2006 to 2015. 
4.1.2 Data assumptions 
• Local currency central government bond market capitalisation is compiled by aggregating 
capitalisation values of medium- and long-term securities from the OECD (2015) database. A 
gap where the OECD (2015) lists the data as unavailable – was taken to be zero.  
• For the GMM model, where gaps exist for both medium- and long-term securities in OECD 
(2015) but figures are available in the AFMI database, aggregate LCBM capitalisation value 
was estimated using the OECD (2015) database as follows: 
o For Angola a power trend line is used to extrapolate the value for 2013.  
o For Tanzania an exponential trend line extrapolates the value for 2013.  
o In the case of Uganda both the OECD (2015) and the AFMI database have no values 
for 2003, therefore a value of 0 is assumed. 
o Botswana lists values of outstanding bonds at fiscal year-end (March). These figures 
are converted to US dollar values at March exchange rates and are assumed to be 
calendar year-end figures. 
o In the case of Ghana, the value for 2003 is not provided by both the Bank of Ghana and 
the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, therefore, 0 is assumed. 
• Gaps in the capital account openness score were filled as follows: 
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o Jahan and Wang (2016) provide scores up to 2013 only. The capital account openness 
index – ka_open – developed by Chinn and Ito (2011) shows no change from 2013 to 
2015 for all the countries in the sample period, thus the ka_bo score for 2013 is extended 
to 2014 and 2015 for each of the countries. 
o CEMAC – of which Gabon is also a member – has a common foreign exchange control 
policy (Banque de France, 2002). This is confirmed by the identical ka_open scores 
from 1993 to 2015. Therefore, the ka_bo score of Gabon – 0 throughout the sample 
period – is assumed for Cameroon. 
o In the case of Madagascar, the ka_bo score for the period 2008 to 2013 is a constant 0, 
therefore 0 is assumed in the years for which no figures are available – 2003 to 2007. 
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Chapter 5: RESEARCH FINDINGS, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
 
5.1  Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the results of the regression analysis conducted on local currency bond market 
capitalisation and the control variables discussed in section 3.1. The preliminary data analysis and 
testing for stationarity are followed by an integrated discussion of the results of the estimations.  
5.2  Data analysis 
 
Prior to conducting empirical estimation, the factors are first tested for multicollinearity by running a 
correlation matrix12. The correlation matrix in Table 5.1 is consistent with economic theory, and also 
with most of the results of the studies reviewed in sections 2.3 and 2.4, and shows that there is a strong 
positive relationship between aggregate bank credit (CRED) and the level of income (LogINC) (ρ = 
0.553). Banking sector depth and the level of income also exhibit a relatively strong positive correlation 
with GDP (ρ = 0.445 and ρ = 0.429 respectively), while Rule of Law (INST) shows a relatively strong 
positive correlation with the level of income (ρ = 0.468). However, these correlation coefficients fall 
below the threshold for multicollinearity. According to Asteriou and Hall (2007) a correlation 
coefficient of 90% (ρ = 0.9) between independent variables is generally accepted as indicating perfect 
multicollinearity. 
Table 5.1: Correlation Matrix 
  EXRATE LogGDP LogINC CRED BUDGET PDEBT INST CAop Gfactor 
EXRATE 1.00                 
LogGDP -0.072 1.00               
LogINC 0.003 0.429 1.00             
CRED -0.016 0.445 0.553 1.00           
BUDGET -0.090 0.205 0.182 0.000 1.00         
PDEBT 0.049 -0.051 0.183 0.222 0.004 1.00       
INST 0.040 -0.340 0.468 0.432 -0.155 0.048 1.00     
CAop -0.055 -0.040 0.207 0.086 0.013 0.075 0.306 1.00   
Gfactor -0.020 0.056 0.054 -0.013 0.077 -0.153 -0.007 -0.019 1.00 
Source: calculations using Eviews 
The second step of data testing is to ensure that all of the independent variables are normally distributed 
and can thus be used in the current form in the regression analysis. The Jarque-Bera test results 
summarised in Table 5.2 show that this condition is satisfied for all of the factors. 
  
                                                          
12 Multicollinearity is when a linear relationship exists between two or more independent variables, thus making it difficult to 
assess whether any of the independent variables are linearly related to the dependent variable (Keller, 2012). 
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Table 5.2: Descriptive Statistics 
  Mean Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
Jarque-
Bera p-value Observations 
Gbonds 8.293 7.557 1.353 3.804 54.758 0.000*** 165 
EXRATE -0.007 0.864 0.776 4.423 30.490 0.000*** 165 
LogGDP 4.308 0.528 1.100 3.410 34.435 0.000*** 165 
LogINC 3.134 0.467 0.233 1.738 12.441 0.002*** 165 
CRED 34.741 45.961 2.195 7.041 244.732 0.000*** 165 
BUDGET -1.932 3.089 0.614 4.531 26.491 0.000*** 165 
PDEBT 0.579 0.606 2.992 15.814 1375.053 0.000*** 165 
INST -0.352 0.648 0.311 2.404 5.105 0.078* 165 
CAop 0.406 0.389 0.377 1.645 16.527 0.000*** 165 
Gfactor 1.004 0.364 0.641 2.542 12.734 0.002** 165 
Source: calculations using Eviews; ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively 
The third step of the pre-estimation testing is to test for stationarity to determine which instruments 
should be included in the GMM models in levels and in first differences, and to ensure that none of the 
factors are second-difference stationary. The unit roots tests of Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) (LLC 2002) 
– which assumes that the panel-based unit root test has a higher explanatory power than individual tests 
– and Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) (IPS 2003) – which averages individual unit root test statistics for 
panels, are utilised. Variables that are nonstationary at level are further tested for stationarity at first 
difference.  
The results presented in Table 5.3 show that exchange rate volatility (EXRATE), budget balance 
(BUDGET), interest payments (PDEBT), capital account openness (CAop) and Rule of Law (INST) are 
stationary at level whereas GDP (LogGDP), level of income (LogINC), aggregate bank credit (CRED) 
and the global common factor (Gfactor) are first-difference stationary.  
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Table 5.3: Unit Root Test Results 
  Statistic Prob.** 
Cross-
sections 
(Obs.)1 Statistic Prob.** 
Cross-
sections 
(Obs.)1 
EXRATE             
  Level   
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -12.829 0.000*** 14 (126)       
Im, Pesaran & Shin W-stat  -16.357 0.000*** 15 (126)       
LogGDP             
  Level 1st difference 
Levin, Lin & Chu t* 0.231 0.591 15 (135) -7.569 0.000*** 15 (120) 
Im, Pesaran & Shin W-stat  3.653 1.000 15 (135) -3.381 0.000*** 15 (120) 
LogINC             
  Level 1st difference 
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -1.563 0.059* 15 (135) -7.113 0.000*** 15 (120) 
Im, Pesaran & Shin W-stat  2.341 0.990 15 (135) -3.208 0.001*** 15 (120) 
CRED             
  Level 1st difference 
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -1.968 0.025** 15 (135) -6.012 0.000*** 15 (120) 
Im, Pesaran & Shin W-stat  -0.197 0.422 15 (135) -2.375 0.009*** 15 (120) 
BUDGET             
  Level   
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -6.897 0.000*** 15 (135)       
Im, Pesaran & Shin W-stat  -3.086 0.001*** 15 (135)       
PDEBT             
  Level   
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -6.599 0.000*** 15 (135)       
Im, Pesaran & Shin W-stat  -2.988 0.001*** 15 (135)       
CAop             
  Level   
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -3.896 0.000*** 15 (135)       
Im, Pesaran & Shin W-stat  -0.566 0.286 15 (135)       
INST             
  Level  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -2.534 0.006*** 15 (135)    
Im, Pesaran & Shin W-stat  -0.885 0.188 15 (135)    
Gfactor             
  Level 1st difference 
Levin, Lin & Chu t* 10.675 1.000 15 (135) 13.471 1.000 15 (120) 
Im, Pesaran & Shin W-stat  2.243 0.988 15 (135) -3.185 0.001*** 15 (120) 
Source: calculations using Eviews; ***, **, and * represent the rejection of the null hypothesis of non-stationarity at the 1%, 
5% and 10% level of significance, respectively. 1Obs. = Number of observations 
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5.3  Dynamic panel results 
 
The results of the baseline regression analysis using equation (1) are presented in Table 5.4a below. So 
as to avoid interaction effects, economic size (LogGDP) and level of income (LogINC) are included in 
separate regression models. The most significant variable is the lagged LCBM capitalisation factor 
(Gbonds(-1)), which has a positive and highly significant effect in both models. This is consistent with 
Essers et al. (2016) and Dafe et al. (2017), and implies that LCMB capitalisation in one year is highly 
dependent on the value of capitalisation in the previous year. The development of local currency bond 
markets is thus a cumulative process. 
The three most significant factors are macroeconomic stability (EXRATE), budget balance (BUDGET), 
and Law and Order (INST). The first two factors are negative, which indicates that elevated exchange 
rate volatility inhibits demand for local currency bonds, and that the influence of fiscal deficits is not 
consistently positive as per the findings of most of the studies reviewed in 2.3 and 2.4. In contrast, Law 
and Order is positive, which implies that legally stable economies help to stimulate investors’ holdings 
of local currency bonds. Advancing policies that address the historical legacies in SSA – low incomes, 
undeveloped infrastructure and limited property rights amongst others – would therefore help to create 
an environment conducive to LCBM development. To overcome the challenges posed by the small size 
of the economies and the transaction costs of holding multiple-currency bonds, establishing regional 
bond funds will expand the economies of scale and help to surmount some of the structural impediments 
in these economies. A benchmark initiative in this instance is the Asian Bond Markets Initiative 
(ABMI)13 – a programme launched in 2002 to develop local currency bond markets in emerging Asian 
economies (Chan, Chui, Packer and Remolona, (2012), Amstad, Kong, Packer and Remolona (2016)). 
Excluding the high market capitalisation countries – Mauritius and South Africa – the estimated 
coefficients show the expected signs, albeit at different time lags. Economic size and the level of income 
influence bond market capitalisation with a two-year lag. The lagged LCBM capitalisation factor 
remains the most significant variable, while the budget balance also proves to be highly significant 
(Table 5.4b). Law and Order remains significant, while capital account openness emerges as a 
significant factor. The results generally accord with Berensmann et al. (2015) and Essers et al. (2016) 
in the sense that both economic size and the level of income are not highly significant. However, 
macroeconomic stability is significant in both models, which is different from the findings of 
Berensmann et al. (2015) that macroeconomic stability (proxied by the inflation rate) is insignificant for 
the subsample, while the significance of the budget balance in both models contradicts the results of 
                                                          
13The ABMI’s objectives are to promote issuance of local-currency bonds, foster demand for these bonds, improve the 
regulatory framework and enhance related market infrastructure in emerging Asian economies. The programme consists of 
foreign currency and local-currency bond funds (Asian Bond Fund 1 and Asian Bond Fund 2) which invest in ASEAN+3 local 
currency bonds 
https://asianbondsonline.adb.org/ 
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Essers et al. (2016). The disparity in these results is accounted for by the divergent structural and 
regulatory frameworks between the smaller and the high bond market capitalisation SSA economies. 
Automatic monetisation of the budget deficit, administered prices and price subsidies on key 
commodities (food and fuel), ineffective monetary transmission mechanisms, and the prominence of 
domestic institutional investors in the investor universe (mainly commercial banks) are the 
macroeconomic characteristics exhibited by most of the smaller economies (Allen et al., 2011). 
Mauritius and South Africa, on the other hand, exhibit relatively large financial sectors and more 
diversified investor bases (with large foreign components).  
The subsample excluding the fragile economies affirms the negative association between 
macroeconomic instability and LCBM capitalisation, which happens to be the most significant factor 
(Table 5.4c). The budget balance and interest payments (PDEBT) show a highly interactive behaviour, 
and thus PDEBT was dropped from the regression analysis (the regression models with PDEBT reflected 
the existence of serial correlation). The value of bonds in issue in the previous year is again significant, 
while the budget balance is the other significant variable.  
The results of the model that assesses the significance of monetary credibility – proxied by the inflation 
targeting dummy – are presented in Table 5.4d. Economic size and the level of income influence LCBM 
development with a two-year lag, as does capital account openness. The budget balance proves to be 
the only significant factor. As expected, monetary policy credibility is significant and positively 
associated with the dependent variable, which is consistent with the literature reviewed in 2.3 and 2.4. 
Furthermore, the inflation targeting economies of Botswana, Ghana, Namibia and South Africa are 
among the most significant countries in the model, emphasising the significance of monetary credibility 
as proxied by a commitment to the inflation targeting framework. However, the non-inflation targeting 
economies of Angola, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Nigeria, and Zambia are also significant, which 
suggests that inflation targeting does not offer a significant advantage over other monetary frameworks 
in SSA. The results, therefore, show that monetary credibility is significant for LCBM development in 
SSA economies, irrespective of the monetary policy framework.  
The coefficients of monetary credibility are positive and of a particularly large magnitude for the high 
LCBM capitalisation economies (Mauritius and South Africa), which suggests that monetary credibility 
is crucial to the development of local currency bond markets. However, other factors contribute to the 
growth of the local currency bond market even when monetary policy is particularly credible. For 
instance, Botswana has an established track record of monetary credibility (Flyvholm, 2004). However, 
limited debt issuance by the government – which stresses the significance of the budget deficit – and 
also by private entities, has constrained growth in capitalisation of the local currency bond market, while 
secondary market activity remains virtually non-existent.  
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The coefficients of capital account openness reflect positive association with LCBM development across 
the models, and the link is statistically high and significant for the low bond market capitalisation 
economies. These economies are generally low- to lower-middle-income economies with limited 
domestic investor bases that are dominated by the commercial banking sector. Therefore, liberalising 
domestic bond markets facilitates foreign investors’ access to domestic bond markets and local 
investors’ access to foreign bond markets, which has a positive effect that helps to broaden the investor 
base. This finding is consistent with the results of Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2006), Burger 
and Warnock (2006, 2010) and Laeven (2014). Foreign investors’ holdings, however, expose the 
recipient economies to global factors that could raise the volatility of the domestic bond market, as the 
economies become susceptible to sudden stops and reversals (Peiris, 2010).  
The results of all models reflect a negative relationship between macroeconomic instability and LCBM 
capitalisation, while capital account openness exhibits a positive association with the size of the LCBM. 
The literature, however, finds that the association between macroeconomic stability and capital account 
openness is nonlinear, with Kodongo and Ojah (2012) finding the dynamic relationship between 
portfolio flows and exchange rates to be country-dependent and time-varying. Liberalised capital 
accounts can thus be beneficial for local currency bond markets and macroeconomic stability. Bond 
inflows are found to reduce exchange rate volatility in some Asian economies (Caporale, Ali, Spagnolo 
and Spagnolo, 2017). Developing economies with better macroeconomic fundamentals, however, can 
attract foreign portfolio inflows even during periods of heightened risk aversion. Lo Duca (2012) shows 
that in the one-year period leading up to the collapse of Lehman Brothers Inc. in September 2008, 
portfolio flows were driven mainly by regional developments across emerging economies. Therefore, 
capital account openness could be positive for macroeconomic stability and LCBM development in 
emerging economies, particularly those in SSA.  
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Table 5.4a: Dynamic panel results – GMM estimations 
Dependent variable: GBONDS 
  1 2 
GBONDS(-1) 0.677***  0.651***  
  (3.069) (3.453) 
EXRATE -1.114* -0.930**  
  (-1.877) (-2.297) 
LogGDP 3.368   
  (0.568)   
LogINC   3.966 
    (0.840) 
CRED -0.084 -0.063  
  (-0.901) (-0.984) 
BUDGET -0.491** -0.483**  
  (-1.969) (-2.298) 
PDEBT -4.240  -3.599  
  (-0.933) (-0.990) 
CAop 5.442 5.686 
  (0.566) (0.656) 
INST 18.868*  17.100**  
  -1.831 (1.958) 
GFACTOR -0.281  -0.382  
  (-0.390) (-0.647) 
Sargan statistic 8.665 8.660 
Probability (Arellano-Bond AR(2) Test) 0.785 0.652 
Observations 120 120 
Instrument count 15 15 
Source: calculations using Eviews; ***, **, and * represent the 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively, t-statistic 
in brackets 
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Table 5.4b: Dynamic panel results – excluding Mauritius and South Africa 
Dependent Variable: GBONDS 
  1 2 
GBONDS(-1) 0.579*** 0.591*** 
  (5.504) (5.701) 
EXRATE -0.591* -0.689** 
  (-1.645) (-1.940) 
LogGDP 0.143   
  (0.042)   
LogINC   8.800 
    (1.392) 
CRED -0.068 -0.099 
  (-1.165) (-1.652) 
BUDGET -0.432*** -0.470*** 
  (-3.531) (-3.835) 
PDEBT -0.481 -0.807 
  (-0.542) (-0.891) 
CAop 16.844** 17.260** 
  (2.067) (2.169) 
INST 10.972** 10.438** 
  (2.247) (2.165) 
GFACTOR -0.525* -0.390 
  (-1.539) (-1.122) 
Sargan statistic 59.635 59.204 
Probability (Arellano-Bond AR(2) Test) 0.400 0.471 
Observations 91 91 
Instrument count 42 42 
Source: calculations using Eviews; ***, **, and * represent the 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively, t-statistic 
in brackets 
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Table 5.4c: Dynamic panel results – excluding fragile economies 
Dependent Variable: GBONDS 
  1 2 
GBONDS(-1) 0.512*** 0.506*** 
  (2.137) (2.049) 
EXRATE -0.777*** -0.809*** 
  (-2.348) (2.0651) 
LogGDP 3.172   
  (0.484)   
LogINC   3.981 
    (0.560) 
CRED -0.072 -0.082 
  (-1.229) (-1.388) 
BUDGET -0.798*** -0.793*** 
  (-2.218) (-2.327) 
CAop 1.457 1.566 
  (0.072) (0.078) 
INST 17.089 17.142 
  (1.271) (1.286) 
GFACTOR -0.411 -0.400 
  (-1.174) (1.140) 
Sargan statistic 31.055 30.974 
Probability(Arellano-Bond AR(2) Test) 0.1354 0.1237 
Observations 96 96 
Instrument count 44 44 
Source: calculations using Eviews; ***, **, and * represent the 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively, t-statistic 
in brackets 
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Table 5.4d: Dynamic panel results – inflation targeting framework 
Dependent Variable: GBONDS 
  1 2 
GBONDS(-1) 0.009 0.009 
  (0.085) (0.089) 
EXRATE -0.018 -0.018 
  (-0.055) (-0.055) 
LogGDP 0.032   
  (0.035)   
LogINC   0.018 
    (0.016) 
CRED 0.002 0.002 
  (0.199) (0.149) 
BUDGET -0.296*** -0.296*** 
  (-2.855) (-2.799) 
PDEBT -0.487 -0.489 
  (-1.134) (-1.196) 
CAop 1.169 1.176 
  (1.040) (1.1051) 
INST 0.769 0.764 
  (0.861) (0.883) 
GFACTOR -0.296 -0.296 
  (-0.831) (-0.823) 
BOTSWANA 3.083*** 3.080*** 
  (3.247) (3.233) 
GHANA 9.112*** 9.108*** 
  (3.591) (3.615) 
NAMIBIA 9.472*** 9.470*** 
  (7.493) (7.196) 
SOUTHAFRICA 22.078*** 22.072*** 
  (9.300) (9.540) 
ANGOLA 6.878*** 6.873*** 
  (4.704) (4.738) 
CAMEROON 3.062** 3.059** 
  (2.283) (2.295) 
KENYA 15.678*** 15.670*** 
  (7.037) (7.154) 
MADAGASCAR 5.538*** 5.532*** 
  (5.102) (5.209) 
MALAWI 1.562** 1.559** 
  (1.956) (1.966) 
MAURITIUS 22.085*** 22.080*** 
  (6.445) (6.401) 
MOZAMBIQUE 2.300** 2.300** 
  (2.380) (2.394) 
NIGERIA 5.389*** 5.383 
  (3.387) (3.409)*** 
TANZANIA 1.818** 1.810 
  (2.008) (2.019)** 
UGANDA 3.295** 3.285** 
  (2.243) (2.297) 
ZAMBIA 5.475*** 5.465*** 
  (3.469) (3.465) 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.692 1.692 
Adjusted R-squared 0.847 0.847 
Observations 163 163 
Instrument count 24 24 
Source: calculations using Eviews; ***, **, and * represent the 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively, t-statistic 
in brackets  
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5.4  Static panel results – corporate bond markets 
 
The results of the analysis of corporate bond markets show that fewer factors determine LCBM (Table 
5.4e). Similar to the results of the public debt market regressions, the lagged LCBM capitalisation factor 
(Cbonds(-1)) proves to be the most significant factor. Therefore, corporate bond market development is 
also a cumulative process. The capitalisation of the government bond market is a significant factor, 
which confirms that corporate bond market development is profoundly dependent on the size of the 
government bond market. Dittmar and Yuan (2007) find similar results in a study of bond markets in 
eight large developing economies14. 
Economic size and law and order, however, do not appear to influence corporate bond market 
development. In contrast, the global common factor affects corporate bond market capitalisation at level, 
while the level of income affects the size of the bond market with a two-year lag. This accords with 
Adelegan and Radzewicz-Bak (2009) who found that the level of income is a determinant of corporate 
debt market development, while the stability of the investment environment is not a factor, although it 
is significant for the government debt market. However, contrary to Adelegan and Radzewicz-Bak 
(2009), exchange rate volatility, budget balance and capital account openness are insignificant. The 
finding that fewer factors play a role in corporate bond market development concurs with Burger and 
Warnock (2006a) and Mu et al. (2013), and suggests that foreign investors purchase government bonds 
(for which these factors are significant) before they get any exposure to corporate bonds. It can thus be 
deduced that the development of the government bond market precedes the development of the corporate 
bond market.  
 
  
                                                          
14The study analyses the influence of US-dollar sovereign bonds (including bonds issued by government agencies) on corporate 
bonds in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Korea, Mexico, the Philippines, Thailand and Venezuela. 
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Table 5.4e: Ordinary Least Squares panel results – corporate bond market 
Dependent Variable: CBONDS 
CBONDS(-1) 0.541*** 
  (3.219) 
GBONDS 0.772** 
  (2.383) 
EXRATE -0.755 
  (-0.362) 
LOGINC 9.435 
  (0.610) 
CRED 0.006 
  (0.070) 
GFACTOR -1.036 
  (-0.400) 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.921 
Adjusted R-squared 0.478 
Observations 37 
Source: calculations using Eviews; ***, **, and * represent the 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively, t-statistic 
in brackets 
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Chapter 6: CONCLUSION 
 
6.1  Summary of the study 
 
The benefit of long-term, local currency capital markets is unquestionably significant for all economies, 
especially for developing economies that face the challenge of mobilising long-term capital to meet their 
developmental needs. However, research on the ability of developing economies to raise long-term local 
currency debt at fixed interest rates in both domestic and international markets is limited in the case of 
SSA. 
Macroeconomic reforms implemented since the 1990s, such as gradually reducing central bank 
financing of government deficits and liberalising credit markets by eradicating administered interest 
rates, has contributed to the development of LCBM in SSA. However, more needs to be done as SSA 
bond markets remain underdeveloped, even compared with other developing regions.  
This study thus sought to investigate the association between macroeconomic stability and the demand 
for local currency bond markets in Sub-Saharan Africa over the period of 2003 to 2015 in order to 
answer three research questions: (i) Is macroeconomic stability as proxied by exchange rate volatility a 
significant factor for local currency bond market capitalisation in Sub-Saharan Africa?, (ii) What is the 
linkage between capital account openness and macroeconomic stability in SSA economies?; and (iii), 
To what extent does a possible association between monetary credibility and government bond market 
development in SSA differ between those that have adopted inflation targeting and those that have not? 
The key findings of this study are as follows. First, the results confirm the negative and significant 
association between local currency bond market capitalisation and macroeconomic instability as proxied 
by exchange rate volatility in Sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, low exchange rate volatility is positive and 
significant for local currency bond market development in Sub-Saharan Africa. Second, capital account 
openness and monetary credibility prove to be positive and significant. The low bond market 
capitalisation economies in particular are likely to benefit from broader investor bases brought on by 
access of foreign investors to the local bond market. Third, monetary credibility is positive and 
significant for local currency bond market capitalisation in both inflation targeting and non-inflation 
targeting economies, irrespective of the monetary policy framework. In addition, the results show that 
the growth of the government bond market is the main determinant of the size of the corporate bond 
market, a trend consistent with that observed in other developing economies.  
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6.2  Policy implications and recommendations 
 
The study affirms that the development of local currency bond markets will not only facilitate the 
mobilisation of long-term finance for development projects, but also strengthens the transmission of 
fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policies in Sub-Saharan African economies.  
Policy measures should thus focus on stabilising the exchange rate as they will also develop local 
currency bond markets by heightening investors’ willingness to hold local currency bonds. In addition, 
liberalising capital accounts will facilitate foreign investor access to local currency bond markets and 
therefore broaden the investor base. Capital account openness on its own, however, is not sufficient, as 
policies to stimulate foreign investor demand have to be implemented. To this effect, sovereign credit 
ratings play a crucial role in disseminating information about the capacity of borrowers to repay debt. 
Therefore, soliciting credit ratings from the leading credit rating agencies (by the countries still unrated) 
will help to disseminate information on the attractiveness of local currency bonds to both domestic and 
international investors. Consequently, measures to improve fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policy 
transparency should also be incorporated into the broader macroeconomic policy framework. 
The development of primary capital markets should be coupled with measures that will stimulate 
secondary bond market activity. This includes legislation to facilitate the launch of derivative 
instruments that can be utilised to hedge foreign currency exposure.  
Limited economies of scale indicate that the growth of local currency bond markets will remain slow in 
most of the Sub-Saharan economies. Policies and legislation on cooperation in establishing regional 
bond funds which raise hard currency in global capital markets and invest in local currency bonds, will 
thus support faster growth of primary bond markets. Legislation that harmonises bond issuance 
requirements across the regions will be necessary in this regard. The establishment of regional trading 
platforms will help to minimise the cost of establishing electronic platforms for the individual countries. 
Integration of holders’ records is also necessary. South Africa has taken the lead in establishing trading 
infrastructure. Automation of trading systems such as South Africa’s Securities Trading Totally 
Electronic (STRATE) and the Electronic Trading platform (ETP) for government bonds launched in 
August 2018 should set a blueprint for regional bond markets which can be rolled out throughout the 
continent. 
Therefore, the optimal set of policy options for local currency bond market development should 
encompass exchange rate stabilisation, current account liberalisation, and monetary credibility.  
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Chapter 7: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
In addition to the need for more research on factors driving LCBM development as bond market data 
for SSA economies becomes more available, future research should also focus on the following: 
1. The link between exchange rate volatility and local currency bond market development in SSA 
as more countries liberalise their exchange rate regimes (Angola adopted a crawling band 
exchange rate regime linking the local currency to the euro with effect from February 2018).  
2. The effects of SSA’s increasing adoption of inflation targeting (Kenya adopted a “full-fledged” 
inflation targeting framework with effect from June 2018). 
3. The threshold range at which the effect of budget deficits switches from positive to negative for 
local currency government bond markets. 
4. The likely impact of the strong growth in the issuance of Eurobonds on the issuance of local 
currency bonds. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A: Central government and corporate outstanding bonds data date ranges 
  Data range 
  Government bonds Corporate bonds 
Angola 2003–2012   
Botswana 2003–2013 2004–2005, 2007-2008, 2009-2017 
Cameroon 2003–2013   
Gabon 2008–2009   
Kenya 2003–2013 2009, 2012-2015, 2017 
Madagascar 2003–2013   
Malawi 2003–2013   
Mauritius 2003–2013 2013-2017 
Mozambique 2003–2013 2009, 2013-2016 
Namibia 2003–2013 2007, 2009, 2012-2017 
Nigeria 2003–2013 2011–2017 
South Africa 2003–2013 2006–2017 
Tanzania 2003–2012 2010, 2016 
Uganda 2004–2013 2013 
Zambia 2003–2013   
Sources: OECD (2015), Bloomberg 
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Appendix B: Information on dependent and independent variables 
Dependent 
variables 
Description 
No. of 
countries 
Years1   Data source 
GBONDS 
Outstanding central government 
local currency bonds as a ratio of 
nominal GDP at end of year 
15     
OECD (2015), Bank of 
Botswana, Bank of 
Namibia, Bank of Ghana 
CBONDS 
Outstanding non-central 
government local currency bonds 
as a ratio of nominal GDP at end 
of year 
7     
Bloomberg, primary 
sources 
Independent 
variables 
Description     
Expected 
sign 
Data source 
EXRATE 
Volatility measured by GARCH 
(1,1), of end of year local 
currency exchange rate against the 
US dollar 
15 
2003-
2015 
Negative 
International Monetary 
Fund International 
Financial Statistics 
LogGDP 
Logarithm of annual nominal 
GDP in US dollars 
15   Positive 
World Development 
Indicators 
LogINC 
Logarithm of annual nominal 
GDP per capita in US dollars 
15 
2003-
2015 
Positive 
International Monetary 
Fund World Economic 
Outlook 
CRED 
Sum of bank credit to central 
government and non-bank private 
sector as a ratio of GDP 
15 
2003-
2015 
Positive or 
Negative 
World Development 
Indicators 
BUDGET 
3-year moving average of central 
government budget balance as a 
ratio of GDP  
15 
2003-
2015 
Positive or 
Negative 
International Monetary 
Fund 
PDEBT 
Annual debt service due of central 
government (interest payments) as 
a ratio of GDP 
15 
2003-
2015 
Negative 
World Bank, Business 
Monitor International 
CAop 
An index of capital account 
openness to bond market holdings 
by non-resident investors and 
residents; 0 = closed, 1 = open 
15 
2003-
2015 
Positive Jahan and Wang (2016) 
INST 
World Governance Indicators 
"Rule of Law" sub-index is used 
as a proxy for institutional quality 
15 
2003-
2015 
Positive World Bank 
Gfactor (π) 
Changes in global risk aversion 
calculated as changes in an 
equally-weighted composite of 
VIX and VDAX 
15 
2003-
2015 
Negative Datastream 
Dummy 
variable 
Description     
Expected 
sign 
Data source 
INFT 
Inflation targeting framework. 1 
for the year in which the country 
adopted "fully-fledged" inflation 
targeting framework, 0 otherwise 
15 
2003-
2015 
Positive National central banks 
See Table. 1 for the dependent variables 
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Appendix C: Exchange rate classification 
Period Exchange rate arrangement 
    Angola 
  2003 to 2004 Freely floating 
  2005 to 2010 De facto peg 
  2011 to 2013 De facto horizontal band 
    Botswana 
  2003 to 2013 De facto crawling band 
    Cameroon 
  2003 to 2013 Currency union 
    Kenya 
  2003 to 2013 De facto crawling band 
    Madagascar 
  2003 to 2013 De facto moving band +/-5%/ Managed floating 
    Malawi 
  2003 De facto moving band +/-5%/ Managed floating 
  2004 to 2011 De facto crawling peg 
  2012 to 2013 De facto moving band +/-5%/ Managed floating 
    Mauritius 
  2003 to 2013 
De facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-
2% 
    Mozambique 
  2003 to 2010 
De facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-
5% 
  2011 to 2013 
De facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-
2% 
    Namibia 
  2003 to 2013 Pre announced peg or currency board arrangement 
    Nigeria 
  2003 De facto moving band +/-5%/ Managed floating 
  2004 to 2013 De facto crawling peg 
    South Africa 
  2003 to 2013 De facto moving band +/-5%/ Managed floating 
    Tanzania 
  2003 to 2006 
De facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-
2% 
  2007 to 2008 
De facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-
5% 
  2009 to 2013 
De facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-
2% 
    Uganda 
  2003 to 2013 
De facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-
5% 
    Zambia 
  2003 to 2013 
De facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-
5% 
Source: Ilzetzki, Reinhart and Rogoff (2017) 
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Appendix D: Inflation targeting in Sub-Saharan African economies 
Country Date adopted Monetary policy regime 
South Africa January 2000 Explicit inflation targeting 
Namibia January 2000 
Explicit inflation targeting by virtue of the 
membership of the Common Monetary 
Area. Section 3(b) of the Bank of Namibia 
Act, 1997 (No. 15 of 1997) ensures the 
Bank's operational autonomy in maintaining 
price stability. 
Botswana January 2002 
The Bank of Botswana has announced an 
inflation target band since 2002 and the 
appropriate institutional framework, laid out 
in the Bank of Botswana Act, 1996, has 
been in place since this date. 
Ghana May 2017 Explicit inflation targeting 
Sources: South African Reserve Bank, Bank of Botswana, Bank of Namibia, Bank of Ghana 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix E: Fragile states 
Year Low-income countries under stress 
2006 Angola Nigeria 
2007 Angola Nigeria 
2008 Angola   
2009 Angola Cameroon 
2010 Angola Cameroon 
2011 Angola   
2012 Angola   
2013 Angola   
Source: World Bank 
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